Nord Stream Attack and Extradition of Suspects: A Legal Assessment of Current Developments

On 26 September 2022, the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines in the Baltic Sea were severely damaged by several explosions. This event caused political, economic, and legal turmoil around the world. These pipelines, which transported natural gas directly from Russia to Germany beneath the Baltic Sea, represented a cornerstone of European energy infrastructure. The attacks are considered one of the most serious acts of sabotage in Europe in recent decades, with implications that reach far beyond energy security into questions of international law, state sovereignty, and European cooperation.

According to investigators, seven Ukrainians are considered suspects. Four of them are said to be experienced divers who allegedly attached explosive devices to the pipelines from a chartered yacht. German law enforcement authorities have been investigating since 2022 on suspicion of sabotage against the constitutional order (Section 88 of the Strafgesetzbuch, the German Criminal Code) and causing an explosion with explosives (Section 308 StGB) in connection with the damage to the Nord Stream gas pipelines. European Arrest Warrants have now been issued for the suspects.

In the summer and autumn of 2025, arrests were made in Italy and Poland, triggering a complex web of European extradition proceedings. While the Italian authorities initially approved the transfer of Serhij K., they later suspended this decision in court. At the same time, Poland refused to extradite Volodymyr Z. altogether, citing procedural deficiencies and national interest reasons.

This means that the focus is not only on the criminal charges, but also on fundamental questions of international and European law: Who is responsible for prosecuting an attack in international waters? Under what conditions may an EU Member State refuse extradition to another? And how far do the legal limits of the European Arrest Warrant extend when political or military aspects are involved? The case is further complicated by its timing – occurring during the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine – raising questions about whether the sabotage might constitute a legitimate military operation rather than a criminal act.

This analysis highlights the legal issues surrounding the extradition proceedings in connection with the Nord Stream attack, outlines the different positions of the states involved, and classifies the proceedings within the European and international criminal prosecution system.

Jurisdiction for Crimes in International Waters: The Nord Stream Case

Before the question of extradition can be raised, it must first be clarified which state is authorised to prosecute. The Nord Stream pipelines run through international waters and the exclusive economic zones of several states. The explosions occurred in the Baltic Sea, southeast of the Danish island of Bornholm – that is, outside German territory, in waters that are geographically distant from the German coast but economically vital to German energy security.

This jurisdictional ambiguity is central to the legal complexity of the case. Under international law, the question of which country can prosecute crimes committed in international waters depends on several connecting principles:

Germany’s Legal Basis for Prosecution

According to the principle of territoriality (Section 3 StGB), German criminal law is generally applicable to acts committed within Germany. However, in the case of offenses committed in international waters or on foreign territory, additional connecting factors apply:

The protection principle (Section 5 StGB) permits the prosecution of offenses committed abroad if they are directed against the highest German legal interests – specifically, against the internal or external security of the Federal Republic of Germany. This principle, recognized in many legal systems worldwide, permits states to prosecute acts committed abroad that threaten their vital national interests. Damage to critical energy infrastructure that supplies Germany may fall under this provision.

In addition, the flag principle may be relevant if ships flying the German flag were involved, as well as the active personality principle if German nationals are among the perpetrators or victims.

Germany justifies its jurisdiction in this case primarily based on the protection principle, as the Nord Stream pipelines served to supply Germany with energy and were considered part of its critical infrastructure. Their destruction is regarded as an attack on the security and supply of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Competing Jurisdictions: Denmark and Sweden

However, Denmark and Sweden, in whose exclusive economic zones parts of the pipelines run and near which the explosions occurred, are also conducting parallel investigations. These states can assert territorial jurisdiction based on the geographic proximity of the attacks to their maritime zones. The question of which state will take over the prosecution has not been conclusively clarified under international law. It may therefore lead to competing proceedings – a situation that creates additional complexity for defendants who could theoretically face prosecution in multiple jurisdictions.

The Warsaw Court’s Rejection of German Jurisdiction

In its reasoning, the Warsaw District Court decisively rejected the German side’s argument, stating that the German Criminal Code does not apply to acts committed in international waters – that is, outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Germany. The court emphasized that the provisions of German criminal law apply exclusively to acts committed on German territory or on ships and aircraft flying the German flag. The application of German criminal law beyond the country’s borders is only permissible in exceptional cases. It does not apply to events that took place in the Baltic Sea at a considerable distance from the German coast. The court therefore concluded that Germany’s attempt to extend its own jurisdiction to areas in international waters had no legal basis.

In extradition proceedings, the question of jurisdiction is relevant insofar as the executing state (the country holding the suspect) can examine whether the issuing state (the country requesting extradition) has any legitimate claim to prosecution. Although the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant restricts the examination of jurisdiction, doubts about jurisdiction – especially in cases of offenses committed in international waters – can influence the willingness of executing states to cooperate.

European Arrest Warrant Procedures in the Nord Stream Case

How the European Arrest Warrant System Works

As the countries involved are EU Member States (Germany, Italy, and Poland), the rules of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) apply to German extradition requests to Poland and Italy. The EAW system, introduced in 2004, revolutionized extradition within the European Union by replacing traditional bilateral extradition treaties with a streamlined mutual recognition framework (where EU countries generally recognize and enforce each other’s judicial decisions based on trust in each other’s legal systems). The following applies:

The request for surrender of the person sought for the purpose of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence must be submitted to the other state using the form in the annex to the Framework Decision on the EAW.

The form submitted must contain, in particular, sufficient information on the identity of the person sought, the decision on which the arrest warrant is based, and the alleged offense(s).

Finally, the EAW must relate to an offense which is punishable in the issuing state by a custodial sentence of at least three years and which can be classified in a ‘category list’ in the annex to the Framework Decision on the EAW.

Double Criminality Requirements and the EAW

If the latter requirement is met, there is no need to examine double criminality (the requirement that an act be criminal in both the requesting and executing countries). The European Arrest Warrant lowers the criteria for extradition requests within the EU compared to traditional international extradition in one fundamental respect: The classic requirement for extradition is double criminality. This means that the actual events underlying a request must also be punishable under the criminal law of the executing state – a requirement that can complicate extradition when legal systems differ significantly in how they define and categorize crimes.

In the case of US extradition requests, for example, it must be carefully examined whether an act that can be subsumed under conspiracy under US law is also punishable under German law, particularly because it can be subsumed under the criminal offense of criminal association.

Within the scope of application of the EAW, this examination is not necessary if the issuing state has classified the act as falling under one of the categories of offenses listed in the Framework Decision on the EAW. These list categories are more abstract than the actual criminal laws of individual EU states. Among others, ‘terrorism’ and ‘sabotage’ are listed (without further explanation in the Framework Decision). This mechanism, which facilitates extradition, is based on the idea that criminal law in the EU is already sufficiently uniform across individual Member States, thereby dispensing with the traditional examination of double criminality.

Procedural Issues in Italy and Poland

However, the Italian proceedings in the Nord Stream case in particular show that the devil can be in the details: in Italy, a decision to extradite Serhij K. had already been made. It was later overturned by the Court of Cassation (Italy’s supreme court) due to procedural irregularities. In Poland, the extradition of Volodymyr Z. was rejected on the grounds that Germany had provided ‘only very general information’. This raises the question of whether the EAW procedure was correctly followed insofar as Poland was provided with the necessary documents.

Legal Obstacles to Extradition in the Nord Stream Case

The examination of possible obstacles to extradition is a central component of international mutual legal assistance proceedings. It determines whether an executing state can agree to the surrender of the accused. In cases with a political, military, or intelligence background – as in the current context – complex issues of international law, criminal law, and human rights arise.

However, a distinction must again be made between extradition within and outside the scope of the EAW. Within the scope of the EAW, there is a fundamental obligation to extradite, which can only be waived if the Framework Decision on the EAW exceptionally allows this, in the form of a ground for refusal.

Classification of Sabotage Under the EAW Framework

Germany accuses the defendant of sabotage against the constitutional order under Section 88 StGB – in this case, specifically, the disruption of public services – and causing an explosion with explosives under Section 308 StGB. The German EAW classifies the events for which extradition or ‘surrender’ is being sought as ‘sabotage’ (but not as “terrorism”). As mentioned, ‘sabotage’ is listed in the EAW Framework Decision.

Nevertheless, the court in Bologna responsible for extradition has imposed high-security detention on Serhij K. in accordance with Italian regulations tailored to ‘terrorism’. Nicola Canestrini, Serhij K.’s lawyer, achieved a partial success in this regard, as the Court of Cassation took the view that the court in Bologna was not permitted to reinterpret the ‘sabotage’ referred to in the German European Arrest Warrant as an offense under Italian law, that is, to ‘nationalize’ it, so to speak. The Italian Court of Cassation identified this as a procedural defect and remanded the case for further consideration. Instead, Serhij K.’s hearing should have been conducted strictly in accordance with Italian law.

This does not mean that Serhij K. will not be extradited after all. In the meantime, the Court of Appeal in Bologna has again approved the extradition. Nicola Canestrini has announced his intention to appeal again to the Court of Cassation. From a European law perspective, there are good reasons to believe that the Court of Cassation will not ultimately reject the extradition on the grounds that the offense is classified as ‘sabotage’, provided that the procedural deficiencies can be remedied. The Court of Cassation should only be allowed to question whether Germany has correctly classified the events underlying the European Arrest Warrant as ‘sabotage’ through a limited review – checking whether the classification is logically coherent (conclusiveness test) and not manifestly unreasonable (arbitrariness test) – rather than conducting a full merits review. Anything else would call into question the mechanism of the European Arrest Warrant.

Functional Immunity Defense: Military Operations vs. Criminal Acts

It seems more difficult to predict how the Court of Cassation will ultimately rule on Serhij K.’s defense team’s claim of functional immunity – the legal principle that state officials cannot be prosecuted for acts performed in their official capacity on behalf of a state. The defense argues that the bombing of the pipelines was a legitimate military operation in the context of the war between Russia and Ukraine. Since the Framework Decision on the EAW does not provide any relevant grounds for refusal in this respect, the defense argues that the question arises as to whether extradition would violate Italian constitutional principles, given that Italy has ratified the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, which govern the conduct of warfare and establish protections for acts carried out during armed conflict.

Political Offense Exception and National Interest

Some states do not recognize extradition if the offense is considered to be politically motivated. In this case, it is assumed that the sabotage in the context of the war in Ukraine may have political connotations. In the case of Volodymyr Z., Poland refused extradition on the grounds that it was ‘not in the interest of the state’. This raises the question of the extent to which international legal instruments, such as the European Arrest Warrant (from a legal perspective), protect against political blockades. This is because the classic obstacle to extradition, namely political offenses, does not in itself constitute grounds for refusal under the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant.

Procedural Rights and Fair Trial Guarantees

In addition, strict requirements apply to defense and fair trial rights. As the Italian case demonstrates, this applies, in particular, to the national procedural law of the executing state. The accused can raise objections, for example, that procedural rights have been violated. The lawyer for the alleged mastermind, Nicola Canestrini, accused the Italian judiciary of ‘serious violations of the fundamental rights’ of his client, Serhij K., and demanded a ‘judicial review’. Canestrini criticized the Italian court for providing ‘completely inadequate’ translation during the hearings, which ‘significantly impaired the effective defense’.

Conversely, the human rights situation in the issuing state, particularly regarding detention conditions, may preclude extradition. In some cases, this may also be relevant to decisions on transfers based on the EAW within the EU, even though all EU Member States are bound by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which establishes minimum standards for the treatment of detainees. Concerns about detention conditions have arisen in some EU states: such concerns relate to Hungary, for example, but less so to Germany, where detention standards generally meet international human rights requirements.

Evidence Requirements in Extradition Proceedings

The executing country may refuse extradition if the facts presented are insufficient.

The Warsaw District Court criticized the actions of the German authorities and the quality of the evidence submitted. It found that the European arrest warrant from Germany had been ‘formally correctly drawn up’, but that its content ‘fits on one A4 page’ and does not contain any source references that would allow an assessment of the merits of the allegations against the accused. In the opinion of the Polish court, such meagre documentation “cannot form the basis for restricting a person’s freedom or extraditing them to a foreign country.”

The Polish court ruling is not without its problems. It is generally accepted that the executing state does not, in principle, examine the suspicion of an offense, not only within the scope of the European Arrest Warrant, but also in other contexts. The extradition procedure is not intended to replace criminal proceedings in the state where the offense was committed. As already mentioned, in the case of extradition based on the EAW for a listed offense, the executing state should only conduct a limited review of whether the alleged offense has been correctly classified under one of the list categories – checking for logical coherence and ensuring the classification is not manifestly unreasonable – rather than examining the full merits of the criminal case. To conduct this review, however, the issuing state must provide sufficient information. If, in the opinion of the executing state, this is not the case, the EAW Framework Decision expressly provides that the executing state shall request additional information from the issuing state.

However, the Federal Government points out that information from intelligence services is confidential and that detailed information is not provided. These confidentiality aspects hinder transparency and, consequently, the examination of the conditions for the extradition procedure.

Defense Strategies in International Extradition Cases: Lessons from Nord Stream

The Nord Stream extradition proceedings offer important lessons for anyone facing cross-border criminal proceedings, whether within the EU or beyond. Extradition proceedings with a political, military, and legal background – as in the case of the Nord Stream attack – require a multi-layered and strategically coordinated defense. Criminal defense lawyers first examine the legality of the European Arrest Warrant. Unclear or incomplete information can form the basis for a request to reject or suspend extradition.

Challenging Jurisdiction in Cross-Border Cases

The question of jurisdiction is of particular importance here: in the case of offenses committed in international waters or outside the territory of the issuing state, it must be examined whether the latter is even authorized to prosecute. The defense can argue that neither the principle of territoriality nor other points of reference under international law, such as the principle of protection, provide a sufficient legal basis for the jurisdiction of the issuing state. The Warsaw ruling demonstrates that a well-founded argument regarding a lack of jurisdiction can be an effective defense against extradition.

Identifying Extradition Barriers

It is particularly important to identify possible obstacles to extradition. These may include the threat of human rights violations, insufficient guarantees of a fair trial, or political influence. In cases relating to security policy or the military, invoking functional immunity or classification as a political act can also be a viable line of defense. Additionally, it must be examined whether there is a risk of inhumane detention conditions or whether the lack of sufficient evidence violates the principle of proportionality.

In cross-border cases involving competing jurisdictions of several states, the defense should also consider the possibility of pointing out alternative jurisdictions or requesting that the proceedings be taken over by a state where more favourable procedural conditions prevail.

Strategic Legal Defense in Transnational Proceedings

Strategic communication with authorities, international organizations, and the media is also becoming increasingly important to create transparency and balance public and legal pressure. Successful criminal defense in transnational proceedings requires not only in-depth expertise in European and international criminal law but also a deep understanding of diplomatic processes, political dynamics, and human rights standards.

Particularly in the case of offenses committed in international waters or on foreign territory, a thorough analysis of the question of jurisdiction under international law is essential. The Nord Stream case illustrates that effective defense can only be guaranteed through